USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

DESIGNING EXCELLENCE INTO AMERICA'S STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION AND RECONSTRUCTION (SSTR) EFFORTS

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ABSTRACT

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   The fall of the Soviet Union left America as the primary leader of an increasingly
interdependent world of nations in a dynamic international security environment characterized
by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. This paper proposes a structural solution to
improving our Nation's ability to respond, and stay engaged for as long as it takes, in
simultaneous Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) world-
wide. The proposed solution employs the right resources against five key SSTR lines of
operations: diplomacy, information, economics, security, and development. It focuses our armed
forces on full-spectrum military proficiency, while providing a robust, rapidly employable
interagency capability to address non-combat SSTR tasks. A new Department of International
Development (DID) greatly improves national and regional integration and synchronization of
U.S. Government (USG), International Organization, Non-governmental Organization and
Private Volunteer Organization efforts in SSTR areas. Lastly, this proposal provides interagency
depth, breadth and responsiveness for SSTRO with full-time and reserve civil support
organizations possessing comprehensive nation-assistance skills, forward-positioned in each
Geographic Component Command (GCC) region. Until a U.S. SSTR structural improvement is
made, the U.S. Armed Forces, as it has done for many years, will continue to represent
Americans proudly overseas executing whatever assignments our Nation deems necessary.

DESIGNING EXCELLENCE INTO AMERICA'S STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION
AND RECONSTRUCTION (SSTR) EFFORTS

> In the era of global security, states that cultivate a citizenry that can work
> effectively with people across borders are likely to gain significant strategic
> advantages.[1]

—Sean Kay, 2006

A World of Increasing Connectedness -- The Call for American Outreach

In a more integrated and interdependent world, we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests – political, military and economic – without active engagement in world affairs.[2] The fall of the Soviet Union left America as primary leader of an increasingly interdependent world of nations in a dynamic international environment characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. America stands at the tipping point of possibly the most peaceful period in human history, where war as we have known it for centuries is banished from the strategic landscape. But to achieve these lofty ends, we need even loftier means. We need to end the disconnectedness that defines danger in our world. We need to shrink the gap between connected and disconnected nation-states and all its pain and suffering – right out of existence. We need to make globalization truly global in a just manner.[3]

The United States, as the global superpower, has a significant role in managing the increasingly connected network of nations. It has a special responsibility that goes along with being a great power and, at times, its global interests and ideals lead it to oppose those who would endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful neighbors.[4] While America and the world are trying to keep up with global expansion and development, formidable and well-organized antagonists are committed to not only stopping the advance but destroying the global engines that drive it. This competing force then places a requirement on global institutions with very different purposes and cultural makeup to partner together like never before. Institutions focused on maintaining order and international development are increasingly required to integrate and synchronize their efforts with the world's armed forces that are trained, organized and resourced to defeat or destroy their nation's enemies.

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing its capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies.[5] That is why we must stay engaged and ensure the process of transitioning disconnected nations into the global network is done right. The global

nature and strategic significance and impact of SSTRO require a holistic national approach to our SSTR efforts. George W. Bush, in the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy states that:

> We will employ the full array of political, economic, diplomatic and other tools at our disposal, including: forming creative partnerships with NGOs and other civil society voices to support and reinforce their work, and work with existing international institutions such as the UN and regional organizations.[6]

The United States military, a key instrument of national power and influence, with unmatched strategic, operational and tactical capabilities, finds itself not only leading America's war on terrorism, but also leading America's global engagement efforts. Additionally, it is increasingly called on to secure the world's globalization efforts, particularly in countries that are either ungoverned or badly governed that either want to plug-in to the connected world or are required to plug-in to the connected world because of their input or influence on global stability. Every day the U.S. military is executing high- to low-intensity combat operations as well as the non-combat strategically impacting stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) so vital to securing the transition of the unconnected or ensuring the stability of those that influence the world's equilibrium and growth.

A longstanding argument however, within political, development, and military communities internationally, is whether military organizations designed and resourced for decisive combat operations possess the skills, knowledge, capabilities and training necessary for excelling in complex SSTRO, especially while simultaneously conducting high- to low-intensity combat operations. Put another way, if military forces are to be called on to provide the security necessary for maintaining global peace, should those military units be specifically designed, resourced, trained and employed to excel in those missions. Many argue that military units are trained for armed conflict, not for operations that place a premium on consensus building, persuasion, negotiation, cultural sensitivity and understanding and appreciating the differences and needs of people who look at life and the world through a different lens.

Certainly, the U.S. military provides unique capabilities that enable it to respond to trouble spots rapidly. It is an institution designed around deployable, self-sustaining capabilities that represent American commitment and resolve and that can bring order to chaos rapidly. Military formations are comprised of Americans with high standards of conduct, discipline and commitment to executing their assigned missions. And although military forces are adequate to contain a crisis or rapidly bring order to disorder, they are not sufficiently adequate to establish and sustain the transition, reconstruction and development infrastructure necessary to rebuild a nation, nor are they adequately prepared to effectively transition military control of a populace to a more lasting, legitimate form of government that represents the people.

This paper will highlight the key lines of operation of SSTRO, illustrate shortcomings or gaps in our current approach to SSTR, offer a structural solution to filling those gaps, and conclude by summarizing the effects of reorganizing American SSTR capability on international security and American engagement abroad. The purpose of my work is to provide another perspective on the necessity of SSTR operations world-wide and the importance of applying the right instrument against SSTR missions in order to achieve an overall standard of excellence in America's international engagement efforts.

Lines of Operation in America's SSTR Efforts: The Way We Make a Difference

This paper presents five key strategic lines of operation in SSTRO: diplomacy, information, security, economics, and development. Each is equally important and all are required to operate in an integrated, synchronized way in order to maximize America's engagement effects.

Diplomacy generally consists of the state-to-state and state-to-international organization relationships so vital in building partnerships and ensuring common understanding. Diplomacy is strategic in nature; irrespective of the level it is being conducted. Whether it is the President or Secretary of State conducting talks with other nations or Ambassadors or State Department representatives negotiating or communicating American policy around the world, this is a key strategic function focused essentially on maintaining or improving peaceful relations and overall international stability.

America's strategic informational capabilities span the range of informational tools from physical informational conduits to messages communicated using those conduits, whether those conduits are animate or inanimate. It is increasingly critical that information reaches individuals of the world faster and in a larger variety of ways than ever before. Messages are being sent continuously via newspaper, radio, television, internet, and local, regional and state influencers such as family leaders, religious leaders, governmental officials, and private and public non-governmental leaders or institutions. Perceptions and agendas drive messages so it is very important for the U.S. to ensure misperceived or intentionally deceptive or untrue messages are rapidly countered while simultaneously ensuring its strategic message are being sent and heard. Ultimately, however, "seeing is believing", so messages not backed up by American actions that are seen by those we want to influence will have temporal meaning, especially when those messages are contradicted by others.

International security and international development are inextricably linked in a globalized, interdependent world. Fundamental to effective SSTRO is security – point, local and national.

All levels of security must be integrated in order to prevent seams that can be exploited by those desiring to undermine SSTR efforts. Ideally, all echelons would stand-up simultaneously with the same level of adequacy. The reality is that each level is performed by a different institution.

Point or site security consists of the protection of sites, buildings, monuments, activities, and key infrastructure that are deemed important enough to require part- or full-time security. Examples include oil refineries, key bridges, air and sea ports, mass transit hubs, financial institutions, museums, and shrines. In many nations, point security is handled by hired security guards with basic security training, minimal equipment and very limited use of force or apprehension authority. Normally, point security guards rely on expedient local police backup when needed.

Local security is generally handled by police forces, whether they are locally or nationally recruited, trained and managed. Arguably, the degree of security and confidence the general populace enjoys is based largely on the adequacy of their local security or police forces. If local security is not established, then transition, reconstruction and development activities are severely impeded and the degree of the populace's confidence and satisfaction in those in charge of the change process is greatly diminished.

Another aspect of local security is emergency response to fires, medical emergencies and limited catastrophes. Critical to creating a secure environment is having the capability to address inevitable emergencies and small crises in the community. Like police security, emergency response capabilities affect trust and confidence of the populace and ultimately affect the legitimacy of those internal and external actors in formal positions of power.

National security is generally undertaken by a nation's armed forces. In many countries, a National Guard and/or Armed Forces Reserve provides military support to local/regional leaders and their police forces while the national army focuses on external threats to national security. All countries differ, but in almost all cases, these various levels of security are required to ensure stability and to ensure reconstruction or development activities can take place with an acceptable level effectiveness.

Perhaps the greatest lever controlling popular satisfaction during a transition is the economic well-being of those having to undergo change. Expectations for a better tomorrow are high and those expectations are greatly manifested in the improvements individuals and families feel in their own personal and collective economic well-being. Any decreases in personal standard of living due to governance vacuums or destruction of infrastructure caused by war or other means are only temporarily tolerated, especially if caused by external actors. This is why it is so vital to not only rapidly emplace economic and financial systems that will assure long-term

well-being, but also to create jobs for those needing and wanting to improve their personal and family economic status. This assurance is especially critical when the displaced environment provided them at least a minimal level of economic well-being.

Specific economic drivers to overall economic well-being include national economic and financial policy, agricultural productivity, and generation of small business and entrepreneurship. Simultaneous multi-echelon economic efforts are necessary to successful SSTRO with particular emphasis on job creation. The working population must be put to work or the population will grow rapidly dissatisfied.

Depending on the indigenous wealth-producing capacity of the country, job training may be a key enabler to putting people to work. As new industries are introduced to a society as a means for building capacity for long-term economic success, a premium is placed on initial and sustainment training in order for their goods to be of the quality necessary to compete with other nations offering like goods and services.

The last line of operation in American engagement is national development, primarily focused on building capacity for national self-sufficiency. American presence in nations in need can be a tough sell to the indigenous population, particularly if they are suspicious or unsure of America's true intentions. It is extremely important to the local populace and their leaders, as well as to external beneficiaries of the nation's connectedness, to increase the capacity of the country to build and sustain wealth and national power.

Specific development efforts include humanitarian assistance as a means to immediately satisfy the nation's most needy, establishment of local, regional and national governances, urban planning, infrastructure improvements, health institutions that address both chronic and emergency care, and a full-spectrum education system.

Humanitarian assistance or relief operations in those situations where engagement efforts are a reaction to disasters or other emergency conditions not only prevents or shortens the period of human suffering, but creates a strong and enduring first impression within the nation being assisted. The quality of relief efforts can either enable or impede other development efforts.

Simultaneously establishing governance at the local, regional and national levels is absolutely critical to creating stability as well as building legitimacy into America's international development efforts, and in the indigenous governments themselves. In many un- or underdeveloped countries, the people had no input to decide their governmental leadership. In areas where America has a stake, representative government will always be a goal, where the

people choose their local leaders, and those leaders are linked to the regional/district and national level governments.

Urban planning and infrastructure improvements allow the nation to generate wealth, and internally and externally connect its people. For example, a new bridge or highway not only has a functional purpose, but generates an emotional response by the people that increases their confidence in the government, and perhaps even serves as a bonding agent for national unity.

Building a multi-echelon health care system not only has an immediate impact on quality of life, but also serves as a confidence booster with the people. Just knowing that care is readily available in the event of sickness or injury, particularly in many undeveloped countries where it was non-existent, is tangible evidence to the people that their government and external supporters are making a difference.

Accessibility to education from elementary- to university-level is a tremendous empowerment mechanism. Education provides the means to exercise intellectual capacity, think rationally, solve problems, and know things that not only satisfy personal desires, but will better enable current and future individual and national success.

Synergy is created by a holistic SSTR approach that integrates and synchronizes the diplomacy, information, security, economic and development lines of operation. It is SSTR synergy that fuels emotional momentum within the populace and ultimately defines success. Key to achieving excellence in our SSTR endeavors is employing the best resources in each SSTR line of operation and having a synchronization mechanism that ensures a systematic pursuit of common SSTR objectives.

Gaps in America's SSTR Efforts

Military Instrument of National Power Leading America's SSTR Efforts

Military forces have executed SSTR tasks and missions for decades. No public institution responds to crises better and more quickly than the U.S. military.[7] The question is not whether military forces are able to get the job done, it is whether they are best suited to get the job done with the degree of excellence we and the people we are supporting expect, and deserve. Some will argue that "okay" is good enough, but "okay" is not the standard we should strive for and will also produce less enduring effects than if experts were applied to the same set of non-combat tasks.

The Center for Defense Information argues that, "humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions put military forces in a double bind. They can be neither too "hard" nor too "soft." If the troops maintain the hard edge necessary to victory in real combat they risk

exacerbating the emergency they came to resolve. If Soldiers and their leaders enforce moderation and accommodation they risk losing the pugnacity that will, in every case, save lives on a battlefield".[8] Conrad Crane, one of the authors of the new U.S. Army and Marine Corps field manual on counterinsurgency operations (COIN), suggests that the Army's involvement in stabilization phase operations has been particularly demanding and has pushed the service to perform numerous unwanted nation-building tasks.[9] Both are really arguing whether military forces are best suited for conducting the non-combat tasks associated with SSTRO.

Sean Kay, in his book *Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace,* states that, "a military can lose its capacity to fight and win wars if their core missions are diluted".[10] Many inside the defense community argue that time spent involved in non-combat related training and operational missions is time that could have been spent honing the skills uniquely possessed by the armed forces – warfighting. The debate continues about whether America's military forces are losing the edge, agility, and motor skills necessary to leverage increasingly complex military systems in combined arms warfare. Many also argue that at least for the foreseeable future, our armed forces will most likely continue to operate in the SSTRO environment; thus the dilemma for our armed forces. The military should always be the force of choice for military operations from raids of insurgent or terrorist safe houses to high intensity combined arms force-on-force maneuver warfare. These activities exist in many SSTR-focused environments, but the point of this paper is that military forces are not the best instrument to be applied against policing, governance-building, reconstruction, and other non-combat SSTR tasks that they are currently performing in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lastly, by using military forces and commands as the focal point for non-combat SSTR missions, we unnecessarily alienate the vast number IOs, NGOs and PVOs wanting to provide resources against SSTR tasks. Oftentimes, these organizations will continue their work, but it will be disconnected from the military, potentially working cross-purpose from military forces resulting in confusion and even friction between the populace, the military and the other supporters involved in SSTRO. This resistance has nothing to do with the character of our service men and women, but oftentimes is a result of the cultural and idealistic barriers that a number of IOs, NGOs and PVOs have erected between themselves and military forces.

In summary, the U.S. Armed Forces continue to prove that they are the preeminent means for addressing hostile forces throughout the world, but in non-combat SSTR tasks, they are only moderately effective due to their limited functional expertise. Additionally, the more time our military forces spend training and executing non-combat tasks, the less time they are training and executing the combat tasks for which they are uniquely suited.

Interagency Unity of Effort

Currently, horizontal and vertical integration and synchronization among the many disparate organizations involved in SSTRO is inadequate. Several elements of the USG play key roles in SSTRO; in some SSTR areas a particularly element of the government may have a lead role, in other areas it may have a supporting role. To illustrate this, U.S. Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, states that, "The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams. Their functions shall include ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks".[11] However, the U.S. State Department is designated as lead agency for post-conflict and reconstruction operations. This adds additional complexity to the synchronization effort, as DOD and DOS must coordinate the lead agency handover sometime during the transition from decisive military operations and post-conflict transition and reconstruction operations. Additionally, other agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice, with police training teams and justice system advisors, and the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representatives Office with economic professionals, are all very involved in SSTRO.

The importance of interagency coordination in responding to international crises was addressed by President William J. Clinton in his 1997 *Presidential Decision Directive (PDD/NSC) 56, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations,* where he states, *"*while agencies of government, like DOD, have developed independent capacities to respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts".[12]

A comprehensive and imaginative integration of all U.S. capabilities is required to reduce future risks in our national security efforts as well as increase America's overall effectiveness in security operations world-wide.[13] The mechanism for synchronizing efforts at the national level is the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (O/CRS) yet as stated above, DOD has assumed responsibility for many aspects of SSTRO, requiring continuous cross-department coordination. The GCCs, who are DOD's agent for military operations in regions of the world, use a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), with liaison officials (LNOs) from many other elements of the interagency, to coordinate the interagency portions of SSTRO. This works well only if the LNOs are empowered to make decisions on behalf of their respective agencies or can get a decision in a timely manner.

In assessing suitable U.S. governmental agencies and their capacities for conducting SSTRO, Barnett states that the only place he has found positive long-range planning in the U.S. foreign policy agencies is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). He goes on further to state that he has long daydreamed about what it would be like to combine USAID's eternal optimism with the Defense Department's rigorous worst-case planning procedures.[14]

The challenge with respect to USAID lies in the organizational subordination of USAID under DOS. USAID, technically a separate reporting activity within the USG, receives funding and managerial oversight by DOS. This organizational flaw places the operational arm of much of America's SSTRO efforts at a level of government too low to adequately coordinate with the other agencies involved in SSTRO.

The complexity of SSTRO is characterized by the involvement of a large number of USG elements, IOs, NGOs, and PVOs making it imperative to have unity of effort. To achieve this, interagency synchronizing mechanisms at various levels must be established to provide common purpose and objectives and to leverage the capabilities of each participant to the maximum extent possible.

Limited SSTRO Operational and Immediate Response Capability

Perhaps the most difficult challenge in conducting SSTRO is strengthening interagency capacity. Principally, civilian agencies must have the capacity to surge critical non-military SSTR capability in a timely manner to ensure success.[15] The lack of robust, quick response capability of civilian agencies and the challenges in coordination ensure that the military bears the brunt of essential tasks in rebuilding and reorganizing a failed war-torn state for a long time.[16]

In many key areas of SSTRO, such as developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, building local security forces, and building indigenous capacity for accomplishing these tasks, America lacks a robust, immediate response capability. USAID is very skilled at assessing, prioritizing, and contracting and managing the work, but lacks any real operational breadth or depth to get work started and completed in a timely manner with any level of consistency.

In prior nation-building operations, civil-police units had to be recruited internationally as individuals, which then necessitated a prolonged period of recruitment and training. In Kosovo, despite prior planning, international civilian-police units did not arrive until nearly a year after the ceasefire marking the end of combat.[17] This is just one example of required interagency capabilities that cannot be satisfied under the current organizational structure. As America's global SSTRO requirements increase, the lack of immediate response capability coupled with

the breadth and depth in capability necessary to make timely progress exacerbates an already ineffective model for America's SSTRO efforts.

<u>Department of International Development: A Structural Solution to SSTR Excellence</u>

The magnitude of the gaps presented above warrant a long-term organizational solution. Rather than treat the symptoms, this paper chooses to structurally solve the problem. Following is an integrated organizational proposal that begins at the strategic level and goes through the GCC regions down to the specific areas where SSTRO is conducted.

A separate U.S. branch of government with the purpose of managing and executing the non-military tasks associated with SSTRO, referred to in this paper as "The Department of International Development (DID)", would serve as America's strategic planning and implementation mechanism for global engagement with respect to both proactive and reactive development efforts in transitioning parts of the world. DID would not only be a strategic management arm of America's national security and engagement strategies, it would also incorporate capabilities-based, rapidly employable engagement entities of the U.S. designed to address engagement and security requirements around the world. DID would not only excel at the increasing non-combat security requirements associated with interagency SSTRO world-wide, but also would set the conditions for stabilization and globalization so that combat never materializes. DID would be comprised of forward positioned, regionally focused, sub-organizations that could be employed with little or no military partnership, or in concert with international military forces that are simultaneously deployed to engage in military operations.

Today's USAID would be subsumed into the new DID. DID, as USAID is today, would be designed, resourced and trained to leverage, and partner with international and host-nation support agencies involved in SSTRO including the U.S. State Department (DoS), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United Nations (UN) and other international organizations (IO), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs). Linkages and routine coordination between DID and the multitude of other organizations and agencies focused on SSTR tasks and missions are integral to the effectiveness of the DID enterprise and therefore must be formally designed into this organization.

DID would be comprised of self-securing international engagement activities with both enabling and operational capabilities. Enabling capabilities would include security, unobtrusive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), urban and infrastructure planning, contracting and program management, economic/business planning, public affairs, and civil-

military coordination that integrates and synergizes the plethora of U.S., international and indigenous resources that are brought to bear on SSTRO at the national, regional and local levels. Operational capabilities would include teams of experts focused on building indigenous capacity for running and sustaining essential services such as power, sewage and refuse, water treatment and distribution, emergency medical, fire fighting, and local security (police). Operational capabilities would also exist to establish and grow small businesses, build and improve agricultural enterprises and other trade activities, and establish medical treatment and chronic care centers. Lastly, DID would include experts in the areas of governance, justice, conflict mediation, and humanitarian assistance.

Enablers provide DID a degree of self-sufficiency in permissive and semi-permissive environments characterized by instability, sporadic lawlessness and a thirst by the general populace for basic needs beyond the capabilities of the host-nation. Reactive situations requiring the employment of DID field units would include natural or man-made disasters and unexpected loss of local, regional and/or national governmental control. Proactive situations of DID employment may include directed development activities aimed at building or reconstructing international communities deemed necessary by the U.S. and its international partners in order to facilitate the transition of a nation-state or region into the global network of nations. DID may also be employed in concert with American and international military/security forces to provide both simultaneous and sequential development capability as military and security aspects of the environment are addressed.

Forward positioned DID regional development entities would be co-located with each of the six U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Currently, each GCC has adopted some form of interagency coordination cell focused on integrating the efforts of the GCC's military capabilities with the non-military stakeholders involved in related endeavors in the GCC's area of responsibility. These GCC coordination cells, or Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) are becoming doctrinal solutions to conducting security operations in an increasingly complex interagency environment. Liaison organizations such as a JIACG can help promote interaction and cooperation among diverse agencies. Consensus building is a primary task and can be aided by understanding each agency's capabilities and limitations as well as any constraints that may preclude the use of a capability. The goal — to develop and promote the unity of effort needed to accomplish a specific mission — can be achieved by establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.[18]

The JIACG provides the critical linkage between the military and engaged USG agencies that allow the coordinated application of all instruments of national power. Successful

interagency coordination enables the U.S.G to build support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals.[19] The JIACG represents an important capability – thinking and operating collaboratively using networked systems and providing an interagency perspective in response to the operational environment.[20]

This paper proposes formally institutionalizing the JIACG consistently across all GCCs and placing them under DID as regional interagency control groups (RIACGs) for conducting U.S. engagement activities either in concert with, or separate from, GCC military activities in the same region. The RIACG would provide expert management oversight of DIDs operational capabilities employed in the GCC AOR and serve as the USG's executive agent for coordinating, integrating and synchronizing non-military USG, IO, NGO and PVO efforts in the GCC's area of operation. The RIACG and its forward employed operational activities would be a supporting element to the GCC when DOD is the lead agency in a particular US effort in the GCC's AOR. The RIACG would be the supported USG element in U.S. actions where DID is designated as lead agency. By co-locating the RIACG with the GCC, a daily working relationship and familiarity is established. The RIACG, for all intent and purpose, serves as a regional USG interagency and international coordination mechanism much like the role a Country Team plays within a specific country. Certainly, the exact composition of each RIACG will be different based on the needs of each region, but the structural mechanism for planning, coordinating and implementing interagency efforts would be a huge step in synchronizing U.S. effects throughout the world.

DID's operational organizational structure would consist of a combination of full-time and part-time Civilian Support Battalions (CISBs), each comprised of three or more Civil Support Companies (CISCs). One full-time CISB headquarters with at least one full-time CISC would be assigned to each of the GCC regions. The full-time CISB and CISC(s) would be operationally employed in support of the GCC's Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) or as part of a Country Team initiative in a specific country.

CISBs would provide enabling administrative and functional support to the CISCs to include personnel administration, unobtrusive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), international law, regional contracting, regional economic/business planning, public affairs, and regional civil-military coordination that integrates and synergizes the myriad of U.S., international and indigenous resources that are brought to bear on SSTRO at the national, regional and local levels.

CISCs would be comprised of a headquarters platoon that would include enabling functions such as intelligence, internal security, logistics, contract management, civil-military

coordination, communications and public affairs. The CISC functional platoons are law enforcement and justice, emergency medical and fire, city planning and civil works, civil construction, governance, economics and small business, and agriculture.

DID reserve operational capabilities would consist of six U.S. Reserve CISBs (R-CISBs), each positioned in one of six U.S. regions: Northwest, North Central, Northeast, Southwest, South Central and Southeast. Each R-CISB would be assigned to one of the six GCC regions that would focus their education and training. The R-CISB would consist of state-positioned Reserve Civil Support Companies (R-CISCs) comprised of volunteer functional experts. These Federal DID R-CISCs would also be made available to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the event of state emergency, as deemed necessary.

The Effects of a Redesigned American International Engagement Structure

Pursuing a structural solution to current SSTRO inefficiencies provides America the best long-term solution to meeting its increasing global engagement requirements. The DID structure proposed in this paper addresses all three gaps or shortcomings that currently exist in our SSTR efforts: 1) use of military forces to execute non-core tasks and missions, 2) insufficient unity of effort due to bureaucratic impediments in the integration and synchronization of U.S., IO, NGO and PVO efforts in SSTRO, and 3) limited U.S. SSTR operational capacity.

With a separate U.S. branch of government focused on the non-combat SSTR tasks, the U.S. Armed forces can focus their training and education on the combat related SSTR tasks and missions. By focusing their time and resources on combat tasks, service men and women and the units they are assigned will gain even greater proficiency, preparedness and effectiveness in low-, mid- and high-intensity combat operations. In an SSTR environment, instead of planning and executing law enforcement and development tasks, our armed forces can focus on the missions uniquely assigned to the military such as finding, fixing and finishing (or capturing) insurgents and terrorists and training host-nation armies.

The proposed DID solution, with its built-in interagency management structure and immediate and sustaining operational capability, provides America with a more integrated and synchronized approach to its global engagement efforts. USAID provides DID a "running start" at the national, regional and country levels, as it continues fostering its already existing relationships with the U.S. military and other elements of the USG as well as IO, NGO and PVO partners involved in SSTRO. The difference is that the USG's international development arm now has Department-level status within the USG as well as regional management expertise co-located with the GCCs.

Lastly, the DID proposal increases SSTR capacity within the USG by providing immediate interagency response capability through its full-time RIACGs, CISBs and CISCs and sustainability with its reserve civil support structure. Americans skilled in the various interagency SSTRO functional areas may find work abroad as a USG part- or full-time civil servant appealing. These untapped Americans would provide the breadth and depth necessary for America to conduct sustained, simultaneous SSTRO world-wide. Essentially, they would provide DID the operational capacity necessary for the USG to conduct SSTRO with greater consistency, timeliness and effectiveness. This proposal increases the number of Americans involved in U.S. efforts abroad, helping nations in need. This large influx of civil servants focused on helping the needy and representing America every day overseas, will not only have internal U.S. nationalistic effects, but will present the kind face of America to people that otherwise get their impressions of us by what they are told.

The cost of significant governmental change, as proposed in this paper, must result in significant benefits. The effects presented above not only increase the quality of SSTR efforts provided nations in need but does so more efficiently.

Conclusion

The United States must find ways to transform its power into a magnetic force that draws peoples and nations to its goals.[21] America has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, or in, transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies.[22] The USG is absent of an institutional mechanism for coordinating post-conflict reconstruction efforts and for preserving institutional memory of prior nation-building operations. Managing a post-conflict reconstruction is an enormously complicated task, made more difficult because it is not done often enough to become routine.[23] It is especially important for us to learn what lessons we can now, rather than waiting for the next contingency, so that we can, once more, reinvent the wheel.[24] We know that our engagement requirements will continue, as nations, particularly the un- and badly-governed nations, will continue to require America's assistance.

This paper has proposed a structural solution that greatly enhances the U.S.'s ability to respond to, and stay engaged in for as long as it takes, multiple SSTR operations simultaneously. It proposes a solution that employs the right resources against five key SSTR lines of operations: diplomacy, information, economics, security, and development. It allows our armed forces to focus on establishing and maintaining full-spectrum military specific tasks and

missions, while providing a robust, rapidly employable interagency capability to address non-combat SSTR tasks. The DID solution also greatly improves national and regional integration and synchronization of USG, IO, NGO and PVO efforts in SSTR operations. Lastly, this proposal builds in SSTRO non-military depth and breadth as well as immediate response capability by resourcing full-time and reserve civil support organizations with the full spectrum of nation-assistance skills and by positioning full-time capability within each of the six GCC regions.

The DID structure and its assumed responsibility for non-combat SSTR activities under this proposal does not lessen the requirement for DOD's military and civilian workforce to enhance the skills necessary to effectively operate in an SSTR environment. Quite the contrary, SSTR skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and IOs, should be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education.[25] This will ensure that service men and women at all levels are better equipped to synchronize their efforts in an SSTR environment with the myriad of interagency and international players. As we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Europe, across the Americas, and in peace enforcement and civil support operations around the world, the actions of individual servicemen and leaders are vital to success and can have strategic consequences.[26] Assigning our armed forces SSTR tasks they are ill-prepared to execute increases the probability their actions may have negative strategic consequences.

The implementation of a structural solution to SSTRO is a lengthy process requiring deeper analysis and lengthy debates, changes in organizational culture, and Congressional approval. In the meantime, the United States must continue to rely predominantly on its military forces to confront all of the military, diplomatic, economic, social and cultural challenges presented in stability operations.[27]

<u>Endnotes</u>

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